This paper studies the oil market effects of phasing out oil consumption subsidies in the transport sector. Welfare effects in different countries are also examined. We investigate potential feedback mechanisms of oil subsidy removal via lower oil prices in the global oil market, which may stimulate oil consumption in other regions. An intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is applied, where OPEC-Core producers have market power. The major subsidizers of oil are OPEC countries, and we find that the effects of subsidy removal here are quite pronounced. Consumption of oil in the transport sector of OPEC countries declines significantly. As a result, the global oil price falls slightly, and other regions increase their oil consumption to some degree. Although OPEC consumers are worse off by the subsidy removal, total welfare in OPEC increases due to higher profits from oil production. 
Introduction
Many countries subsidize the production and consumption of fossil fuels. Most subsidies are given downstream, that is, to reduce the cost of consuming fossil fuels (Coady et al, 2016) . While fossil fuel subsidies benefit fuel consumers, at least in the short run, such subsidies have a number of negative effects (IEA, 2014) . First, they contribute to fiscal imbalances and thus crowd out other government spending. Second, subsidies stimulate excessive fossil fuel consumption contributing to increased emissions of harmful pollution such as CO 2 . Finally, in the long run low oil prices encourage the development of energy-intensive industries and discourage development of renewable technologies.
Despite the negative effects it has proven difficult to remove fossil fuel subsidies. In many countries fossil fuel subsidies were originally introduced to improve consumer welfare and proposals to remove such subsidies could result in citizen protests. We find, however, that the biggest subsidizers may increase their welfare by removing its oil subsidies. The reason is that subsidy removal allows these countries to shift oil from the domestic market to the international market where prices are higher.
The biggest fossil fuel subsidizers are also major producers and exporters of oil and gas. In fact, the heaviest fossil fuel subsidizers are the OPEC-countries, mostly located in the Middle-East and NorthAfrica (MENA) region. Public spending on subsidies -estimated as the gap between international and domestic prices -is, on average, much higher in the oil exporting MENA region than in other countries. In particular, there are extensive subsidies in the transport sector. According to IMF (2014) , subsidies of gasoline and diesel in the MENA countries, representing around half of all energy subsidies in the region, amounted to almost 4 per cent of the regional GDP in 2012. Oil products used in the transport sector are also subsidized to a certain degree in other Non-OECD countries (GIZ, 2014) . In this study we examine the effects of eliminating subsidies in the transport sector, focusing especially on the OPEC countries but also some other Non-OECD countries.
Price control is often a key element in fossil fuel consumption subsidies. However, subsidies can also include cash transfers directly to consumers, as well as tax exemptions and rebates. Assessing the magnitude of fossil fuels subsidies in all its forms is a task challenged by poor data quality, limited data availability and lack of data comparability (Ellis, 2010) . Like many other studies we use the price-gap method, which calculates the combined effect of reducing the wedge between domestic and international (reference) prices (Koplow, 2009 ). The reference price on goods that are traded on the international market, like oil, is usually the international or border price adjusted for market exchange rates, transport and distributional costs, and country specific taxes and tariffs. As we focus on pricegap subsidies in the transport sector, we can apply a consistent and uniform dataset as in GIZ (2014) (former GTZ), which lists the retail prices of diesel and gasoline in 174 countries, and assess the effects of subsidy reforms. 1 Oil prices were halved from October 2014 to January 2015, and are, according to current futures prices, expected to remain around 50-60 USD per barrel for several years. The oil price fall presents countries with a unique opportunity to phase out fossil fuel consumption subsidies, since the wedge between the global oil prices and the domestic prices in subsidizing countries have been reduced. As a result, consumers would be less hurt by subsidy removal, at least in the short run. In addition, the recent drop in the oil price has reduced government incomes in OPEC countries, and removal of fossil fuel subsidies would help improve fiscal balances. Several OPEC countries have recently reduced (implicit) subsidies on gasoline and diesel, including Angola, UAE, Saudi-Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Qatar (IEA, 2016a) . In 2016, fuel prices in Venezuela increased dramatically due to reduced subsidies (Bloomberg, 2016) . Other countries outside OPEC, such as India, have also started similar price reforms on gasoline and diesel (IEA, 2016a) . This paper analyzes how removal of oil consumption subsidies in the transport sectors might affect oil consumption and production in major geographic regions in the world. The transport sector is important for the oil market as it currently accounts for 54 per cent of the world's fuel liquid consumption, and the share is expected to increase to almost 60 per cent in 2040 (IEA, 2014) . We focus on subsidy removal primarily in OPEC countries, but also to a certain extent in other countries.
We also consider a situation where all subsidizing countries introduce moderate fuel taxes. We compare the welfare effects of these policies for different regions, distinguishing between effects on consumers, producers and the government. To analyse these effects, we use a numerical model of the international oil market called Petro2 (Aune et al, 2016) . The model incorporates dynamic behavior by oil producers, and distinguishes between competitive producers and producers with market power. The model is described in more detail below.
Our analysis suggests that OPEC may achieve significant welfare gains by removing the oil subsidies in their transport sector. On the one hand, OPEC consumers experience a loss due to the higher consumer prices following subsidy removal. In addition, there is a producer surplus loss following a 6 lower world market oil price. On the other hand, removing oil subsidies involves a huge transfer from oil consumers to the government (or to oil producers, depending on who is in fact paying the subsidies), such that the losses from reduced subsidies are dominated by government gains. The reason is that subsidy removal reduces OPEC oil consumption, and this oil can be sold in the global oil market at significantly higher prices. In other words, the willingness to pay for oil is higher in the global oil market than within OPEC (before subsidies are removed). Further, we find that when all countries remove oil subsidies in the transport sector, the global welfare gains increase. However, our analysis suggests that this leads to lower welfare gains for OPEC as the value of their oil resources deteriorates due to lower oil prices. This is described in more detail in Section 4.3.
Although subsidy removal may be profitable for OPEC, it may have some feedback effects in the oil market that is worth studying. One feedback mechanism is leakage, i.e. reduced demand for oil in the transport sector in OPEC may lead to lower oil prices and correspondingly higher consumption in other countries (see, e.g., Felder and Rutherford, 1993; Böhringer et al, 2014) . Another feedback mechanism is related to the "green paradox" (see e.g. Sinn, 2008; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012), i.e., fossil fuel suppliers might find it profitable to accelerate extraction if they foresee reduced demand in the future, e.g., due to gradual phasing out of subsidies, more stringent climate policies etc.
The two feedback mechanisms are related to each other, and both are highly dependent on the price responsiveness of demand and supply in the energy markets. The more price responsive demand is relative to supply, the bigger the leakage effects. As indicated above, the green paradox effect depends heavily on the timing of the subsidy removal, but also on the price responsiveness.
Two characteristics of the oil market may be of particular importance when we study the feedback mechanisms of subsidy removal, namely market power and intertemporal behavior. There is little consensus in the literature regarding OPEC's behavior in the oil market, except that most studies reject the hypothesis of competitive behavior (see e.g. Smith, 2005; Hansen and Lindholt, 2008; Kaufmann et al.,2008; Huntington et al., 2013) . 2 We present a model where we assume Cournot behavior, which means that a core of countries within OPEC takes Non-OPEC's and non-Core OPEC's extraction path as given, but maximizes joint profits taking into account the price responsiveness on the demand side.
Similar assumptions have been made in earlier simulation models of the oil market (e.g., Salant, 1982; 7 Berg et al., 1997 7 Berg et al., , 2002 Aune et al., 2010; Okullo et al., 2015) . However, none of these studies analyze the effects of phasing out subsidies.
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Another potentially important feature is the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource, i.e., extraction of oil has intertemporal effects as it reduces available resources in the future (Hotelling, 1931) . This is taken into account in our model, as oil producers are forward-looking and maximize their net present value of oil extraction. This dynamic feature is important for the "green paradox" effect.
Many studies have analyzed different effects of reducing fossil fuel subsidies. Ellis (2010) surveys five studies that examine the effect of reducing price-gap subsidies on fossil fuels. All studies find an increase in welfare in the countries where policy measures are taken. Burniaux and Chateau (2014) presents an analysis of a phase out of fossil fuel price-gap consumption subsidies based on a general equilibrium model. Their analysis suggests that such a subsidy reform will reduce GHG-emissions and be welfare improving for the world as a whole, although some regions will experience reduced welfare. The above mentioned studies do not focus on fuel subsidies in particular and their impact on the global oil market. Some studies focus on the effects of fuel subsidy removal on the subsidizing countryʼs welfare, using oil supply and demand elasticities, such as Larsen and Shah (1992) , SalehiIsfahini (1996) and Gurer and Ban (2000) . Despite the huge subsidies in the transport sector, we have only found one study that focuses on the effects of fuel subsidy removal on the global oil market, i.e. Balke et al (2015) . They find that subsidy removal in 24 oil-producing countries generally is welfare enhancing for both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. However, their model is static and the producers have competitive behavior. Thus, our contribution is to study the implications for the oil market, taking into account both market power and the intertemporal aspect of exhaustible resources.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Petro2 model, Section 3 presents the policy scenarios analyzed, the approach used in the analysis of welfare effects, and results from the numerical model. Section 4 concludes.
Model description
Petro2 is a dynamic simulation model that permits for analysing oil market effects of policy changes or other external shocks to the market (e.g., shifts in cost or oil reserve levels). 
Demand
Every region and sector demands an energy aggregate, modeled as a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)-aggregate of the various energy goods. The price of this energy aggregate (in a sector in a region) is assumed to be the weighted CES-aggregate of the prices of these energy goods, where the initial budget shares are weights. The model specifies the long-term demand for the energy aggregate as log-linear functions of population, income (GDP) per capita, and price of the energy aggregate. Demand for a specific energy good in a sector and region is a function of the initial budget share, the demand for the energy aggregate as well as the end-user price of the energy aggregate relative to the end-user price of the specific energy good.
All energy goods are bought at regional product prices. The end-user prices include costs of transportation, distribution and refining in addition to existing taxes/subsidies. End-user prices and regional product prices are linked as follows: The end-user price of a given fuel in a given sector and region is equal to the regional producer price of the fuel (node price) plus costs of transportation, distribution and refining in addition to existing taxes/subsidies.
End-user prices, regional product prices and taxes/subsidies are generally taken from OECD ( (this is adjusted for each sector).
The direct price elasticities are constant as we use log-linear demand functions for the energy aggregate. The price elasticities for energy are set to -0.5 in all sectors, based on, e.g., the discussion in 
Oil Supply
Production allocation over time is important for the suppliers since oil is an exhaustible resource.
Extracting one more unit today will affect a supplier's costs or access to oil resources in the future.
Hence, a rational producer will not only consider the current price or market condition before choosing the current optimal oil supply. We therefore model the supply of oil in an intertemporal way, where the producers maximize the present value of their oil wealth. A market interest rate of 10 per cent is used as a (real) discount rate in all regions except for OPEC, which has a rate of 5 per cent. Oil 10 production in OPEC is more government-controlled than in most other regions. Their oil extraction is also to a larger extent than Non-OPEC countries undertaken by state-owned companies. Thus, OPEC may attach more weight to long-term income than most other producers.
To analyze the importance of market power, the international oil market is modelled as a market with a cartel (corresponding to OPEC-Core) and seven competitive fringe producers (i.e. the Non-OPEC regions plus non-Core OPEC). The fringe producers always consider the oil price path as given, while the cartel regards the price as a function of its supply. Hence, the marginal revenue for the fringe is equal to the price, whereas for the cartel marginal revenue is in general less than the price. Both the fringe producers and the cartel take the supply of all other producers as given when deciding their own production profile (Salant, 1976) . Hence, we have a Nash-Cournot model with one Cournot producer and a competitive fringe. Production figures are from IEA (2016b).
The initial cost level of the different producer groups differs, reflecting among other things that extraction costs in OPEC-countries generally are lower than in the rest of the world. The initial unit costs of oil production are calculated from Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2011) and EIA (2012).
The cost functions of both the cartel and the fringe are assumed to be increasing functions of cumulative production, i.e., costs increase due to depletion of the oil resources. The scarcity rent of a producer then reflects that extracting one more unit today increases costs tomorrow. Hence, we focus on economic exhaustion rather than physical exhaustion. The depletion rates in the cost functions are calibrated based on data and supply projections from EIA (2012), IEA (2013 ) and Lindholt (2013 , and varies substantially across regions (lowest for OPEC and highest for Western Europe).
Unit costs are reduced by a constant rate each year due to technological change, independent of production. This means that over time unit costs may be reduced or increased, depending on the production rate (depletion vs. technology effect). The future rates of technological change are very uncertain. We have generally assumed the rate of technological change in oil production to be 2 per cent per year for all producers.
We assume that it is costly to alter production in the initial years for the fringe producers. This is modeled as increasing marginal costs also within a period (in addition to costs increasing in accumulated production). Hence, output from the fringe producers is quite rigid initially, but the effect is gradually reduced over time. This initial inflexibility is not modeled for the OPEC-Core producers as they have generally more spare capacity and lower capital costs (see the Appendix).
In equilibrium, the price in each period for the fringe producers must be equal to marginal costs plus the scarcity rent. The latter is the negative of the shadow costs associated with cumulative production, i.e., the alternative cost of producing one more unit today (as it increases future costs). Similarly, for the cartel OPEC-Core the oil price must be equal to marginal costs plus the scarcity rent as well as the cartel rent.
The effects of oil subsidy removal in transport sectors
As subsidies are removed, consumer prices rise in previously subsidizing countries. Consumers in these countries will buy less oil, and this will put a downward pressure on the global oil price. So while removal of oil subsidies reduces oil consumption in some regions, oil consumption will likely increase elsewhere. Below we explore the oil market effects of three scenarios for oil subsidy removal.
We also estimate the welfare changes following subsidy removal for consumers, producers and the government for the OPEC core countries. A brief sensitivity analysis with respect to the calibration of important Petro2 parameters is given in Appendix B.
Policy scenarios
We consider three policy scenarios for fossil fuel subsidies removal in the transport sector, see Table   1 , and compare the effects for the oil market and for the welfare in different countries. In the first scenario, subsidies are removed only in OPEC countries, while in the second scenario subsidies are removed in other countries, too. Removal of fossil fuel subsidies could be driven by fiscal necessity but also by international pressure related to climate policy. The third scenario considers the case where, in addition to subsidy removal, fuel taxes in the transport sector are increased to the current US level (regions with tax levels at least as high as in the US do not change their taxes). While removal of fossil fuel subsidies would improve the fiscal situation of subsidizing countries, these countries may also experience social instability when consumers' welfare is reduced. If the overall welfare effect in society is positive, fossil fuel consumers may be compensated for their welfare loss. For each scenario we explore the welfare effects to see if such compensation is feasible.
Subsidy removal is implemented in the model by removing negative wedges between the global oil market price (plus fixed transport and distributional costs) and the domestic price for oil in the transport sector (cf. Section 2). The policy scenarios are compared to a reference scenario, which to a large degree mimics the projections of the New Policy Scenario in IEA (2013) until 2035, and then assumes a gradual decline in the use of oil in all sectors of the economy (following, e.g., IPCC, 2014). 
Numerical analysis
In this section we present numerical results for the oil market from the different simulations, including region specific effects on welfare following the subsidy removal policies. Before examining the policy scenarios, we briefly present the reference scenario. Figure 1 shows the development of the oil price towards 2050 in the reference scenario. We emphasize that the reference scenario is not a projection of the future, but a starting point to study the effects of different policies. As the model assumes that oil producers have perfect foresight, and there are no adjustment costs in production for OPEC-Core, the oil price path shows a smooth increase over time also through the economic downturn after the financial crisis in 2008-9. The price increase continues through 2050 even though the share of oil gradually declines over time in all sectors and regions. The reason is that despite technological improvements in oil extraction, there is a gradual scarcity of oil pushing the oil price upwards. Our reference price scenario is somewhat higher than the New Energy Figure 1 also shows the development in OPEC and Non-OPEC production towards 2050. We notice that global production is increasing over time, especially until 2040, and that OPEC's market share is growing. The latter is due to bigger reserves and lower extraction costs than in Non-OPEC countries. However, if fuel taxes are also implemented in OPEC countries (at US levels), oil demand is further reduced by an additional 3 percentage points. Thus, removing fuel subsidies has far bigger impacts on OPEC's oil demand than implementing fuel taxation at US levels. Effects on global consumption of oil in the transport sector are shown in Figure 3 . In the scenario where only OPEC countries remove their subsidies, global consumption is reduced by up to 3 per cent.
Simulation results: Reference scenario
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This reflects that OPEC countries account for almost 10 per cent of global oil consumption in the transport sector in 2020. However, due to somewhat lower oil prices (see Figure 4) there is a slight increase in oil demand in Non-OPEC countries' transport sector. The oil consumption leakage is 22
per cent in 2020 in the scenario when only OPEC countries remove their subsidies. When all countries remove their subsidies, the decline in oil consumption is only slightly bigger, as fuel subsidies are much more widespread in OPEC countries than in most other countries. Implementing fuel taxes at a minimum of US levels has bigger impacts on oil consumption, cf. Figure 3 .
We also notice from the figure that there is in fact a slight increase in initial oil consumption in the three policy scenarios. The explanation is that oil producers (mainly OPEC-Core), foreseeing that fuel subsidies are gradually removed over time, realize that future oil prices will be reduced. As a result, it is optimal to accelerate extraction to some degree, implying slightly lower oil prices also initially. We return to this issue below (in relation to Figure 5 ). One reason for the moderate price effect is that lower oil prices lead to increased demand in other countries, dampening the initial price effect of reduced demand due to subsidy removal. We have only found one study that looks at subsidy removal when the oil price is endogenous (Balke, 2015) .
However, the oil price decline in our study is lower than in their study, where the removal of fuel subsidies in oil producing countries would reduce the world market price of oil by six per cent. Part of the reason could be that we model OPEC-Core as a cartel, which finds it profitable to reduce production to prevent the oil price from declining too much (see Figures 5-6 below) . up to a minimum of the current US level (i.e., regions with initially higher fuel taxes do not change 17 their tax levels), the oil price declines somewhat more, i.e., by 1 to 1.5 per cent. Still, it is fair to conclude that the oil price is not much affected by subsidy removal or moderate fuel taxation.
Figures 5 and 6 show the production of OPEC and Non-OPEC countries, respectively. 7 Both groups of producers reduce their oil production in the policy scenarios. Except for the first few years, we see that the biggest reduction comes from OPEC-Core. This reflects that OPEC-Core takes into account its market power, knowing that it can influence the oil price by cutting back on its production when demand contracts. On the other hand, we also notice that OPEC-Core produces more initially ( Figure   5 ) to compensate for the bleaker demand prospects in future years. This is similar to the "green paradox" effect mentioned in the introduction, which is a result of our modelling of oil as an exhaustible resource. That is, extraction of oil has intertemporal effects as it reduces available resources in the future. Due to spare capacity, OPEC-Core is more able to adjust its initial production than other oil producers, who hardly change their initial extraction as a result of the subsidy removal.
Figure 5 Percentage changes in OPEC and OPEC Core oil production compared to the reference scenario.
7 OPEC production includes the production of OPEC-Core countries as well as the production of non-Core OPEC countries. 
Welfare effects following subsidy removal policies
This section examines how removing oil subsidies in the transport sector affects welfare. We approximate changes in welfare, as compared with the reference scenario, using yearly changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and net subsidy payments. We then calculate the present values of these changes for all regions and sectors over time, using a yearly social discount rate of 5 per cent and linear approximations to the demand and supply functions around the market outcome.
The welfare effects following subsidy removal policies in a given region depend on whether it is a net exporter or net importer of oil. As shown in the previous section, subsidy removal reduces the global oil price. This affects the terms of trade between regions. Whereas lower oil prices benefit net oil importers through a lower net oil import bill, net exporters loose income from oil sales. Further, removing oil subsidies involves a transfer from oil consumers to the government. We do not consider the distributional effects this may have in the present paper, and consumer losses from reduced subsidies are to a large extent dominated by government gains. The net present value of the welfare gain amounts to 9 per cent of the base year GDP in OPEC. Except for Russia and Rest of OECD, all other regions are net importers of oil over the whole time horizon and thus also experience welfare gains due to lower oil prices, but the magnitudes are modest and less than 2 per cent of regional base year GDP. Russia is a net exporter of oil and loose due the lower oil prices. The Russian welfare loss is approximated to 5 per cent of its GDP. Rest of OECD switches from being a net importer to a net exporter in 2034 (in all scenarios), and gains very little from lower oil prices.
As expected, OPEC consumers experience a loss due to the higher consumer prices following subsidy removal. Regarding changes in OPEC oil revenue, the change in producer surplus depicted in Figure 7 refers to the initial producer surplus loss following a lower world market oil price. On the other hand, we know that subsidy removal allows OPEC to sell all its oil at the world market oil price, which is substantially higher than the low subsidized prices in the reference scenario. The associated increase in oil revenue is equal to the "net subsidy payment" in Figure 7 . OPEC also increases its yearly oil exports by between 1 and 2 per cent (it varies over time) when OPEC consumer subsidies are removed. The change in the value of OPEC oil resources following subsidy removal may be interpreted as equal to the sum of "net subsidy payment" and "producer surplus" in Figure 7 .
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The significant welfare gain in OPEC may explain why Saudi Arabia, UAE and other OPEC countries reduced their oil subsidies on gasoline and diesel in 2015 (IEA, 2016b). As we see in Figure 7 , however, there is a substantial OPEC consumer loss associated with subsidy removal, which can make these policies unpopular and difficult to implement. This may help explaining the timing of the OPEC members' cut in oil subsidies. That is, they may use the current low oil price to dampen the experienced loss in consumer surplus following oil market subsidy reductions. The second scenario we consider in this section is the TranspTax scenario, where we phase out all oil consumption subsidies to transport sectors and implement US transport tax levels in all regions within 2020 (given that the region initially has taxes below US tax levels). 10 As expected the effects are somewhat larger in all regions, but still small compared with OPEC, see Figure 9 . The lower global oil price reduces the value of oil further and the decline in producer surpluses are larger than those associated with the TranspOPEC scenario. OPEC welfare gain is therefore only 2 per cent, and Russia now experiences a welfare loss equal to 7 per cent. Except for OPEC, the largest net welfare gain is in China (2 per cent), where consumers benefit from lower oil prices. The robustness of our results with respect to important parameters is presented in Appendix B.
10 The results in the TranspAll scenario are very similar to those of TranspOpec, and therefore omitted from this section. 
Conclusions
Many OPEC countries and some other Non-OECD countries subsidize fossil fuel consumption, which is problematic for a number of reasons. It leads to inefficiently high consumption, depletes government finances and has negative environmental effects. Countries subsidize fossil fuel consumption in a multitude of ways and it can be challenging to measure the magnitude of the actual subsidies.
We focus on price-gap subsidies where the price-gap is the difference between the international and the domestic oil prices that is not a result of taxes or transportation or distributional costs. Price-gap subsidies are generally largest in the transport sector in OPEC countries. In this study we therefore examine the effects of eliminating subsidies in the transport sector, focusing especially on the OPEC.
We apply a new intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market, where OPEC-Core producers have market power. That is we assume Cournot behavior, which means that a core of countries within OPEC takes Non-OPEC's and non-Core OPEC's extraction path as given, but maximizes joint profits taking into account the price responsiveness on the demand side.
We investigate potential feedback mechanisms of oil subsidy removal. Our results show that consumption in the transport sector in OPEC countries declines significantly and as a result the global oil price falls, which stimulates oil consumption in other regions. However, the oil price decline in our study is lower compared to other studies. One explanation may be that we model OPEC-Core as a cartel making it profitable for them to reduce production to prevent the oil price from declining too much. Our results also suggest a small green paradox effect as OPEC-Core finds it profitable to accelerate its extraction somewhat.
We also investigate regional welfare effects of phasing out subsidies. Although OPEC consumers are worse off by the subsidy removal, total welfare in OPEC increases due to higher profits from oil production. Our central results are robust with respect to important parameters.
Appendix A: A formal description of the Petro2 model Demand side
We have seven regions i, where both demand and production take place: OPEC, Western Europe (EU/EFTA), U.S., Rest-OECD, Russia, China and Rest of the World (on the supply side we can divide OPEC into OPEC-Core and Non-Core OPEC). Demand for final energy goods in each region is divided into six sectors s: Industry, Households, Other sectors (private and public services, defense, agriculture, fishing, other), Electricity, Road and rail transport, and Domestic and international aviation and domestic shipping. In addition, there is one global sector: International shipping. We have six energy commodities/fuels f: Oil (aggregate of different oil products), Gas, Electricity, Coal, Biomass and Biofuels for transport.
All variables are functions of time. However, we generally skip the time notation in the following. The functional forms and parameters are generally constant over time. 
List of symbols:
Endogenous variables: The end-user price of fuel f in sector s in region i is equal to the regional producer price of the fuel (node price) plus costs of transportation, distribution and refining in addition to existing taxes/subsidies:
We assume that demand for energy goods can be described through CES demand functions. Hence, we construct weighted aggregated fuel price index for each sector s and region i:
1 (1 ) ( .
In order to take account of short-and medium-term effects, the demand functions are specified in the following partial adjustment way (here we include the time notation): 
Oil supply side
We have seven or eight oil producing regions i, depending on whether or not OPEC is split into OPEC-Core and Non-Core OPEC (this is the case in the current paper). Below we refer to OPEC as the cartel (C) -if OPEC is split into two, only OPEC-Core is assume to act as a cartel, while NonCore OPEC is assumed to act as a competitive producer. The six Non-OPEC regions (NO) are always modelled as competitive producers.
List of symbols:
Endogenous 
The optimization problem for the oil producers
OPEC's residual demand (for fixed Non-OPEC production X NO ) is:
OPEC maximizes the following discounted profit over time:
The cost function of OPEC in period t has the following functional form:
C t c are the unit costs given by the following function:
We assume that unit costs are increasing in accumulated extraction A C. . Hence, the Lagrangian function becomes: 
